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With European Monetary Union (EMU), there was an increase in the adjusted 
spreads (corrected from the foreign exchange risk) of euro participating countries’ 
sovereign securities over Germany and a decrease in those of non-euro countries. 
The objective of this paper is to study the reasons for this result, and in particular, 
whether the change in the price assigned by markets was due to domestic factors 
such as credit risk and/or market liquidity, or to international risk factors. The 
empirical evidence suggests that market size scale economies have increased since 
EMU for all European markets, so the effect of the various risk factors, even 
though it differs between euro and non-euro countries, is always dependent on the 
size of the market.  
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  1Introduction. 
Before the introduction of the euro, yield differentials between European 
sovereign borrowers were mostly determined by four factors: expectations of 
exchange rate fluctuations, differences in domestic tax-regimes, differences in 
credit risk, and differences in market liquidity. The introduction of a common 
currency in twelve countries in January 1999 and the elimination (or reduction to 
insignificant levels) of differences in tax treatment during the 1990s eliminated 
two of these factors in euro-participating countries, and paved the way for a much 
more integrated and competitive public debt market. As a result, euro-area 
government bond markets began to be considered as a single market, comparable 
in terms of size to the US or Japan. Nevertheless, segmentation did not disappear 
completely. In 2005, public debt management is still decentralised under the 
responsibility of 12 sovereign issuers with differences in rating and a variety of 
issuing techniques (see Favero, Missale and Piga, 1999). These are features that 
distinguish the euro-area debt market from its US and Japanese counterparts. One 
example of this segmentation is the persistence of yield differentials. This paper 
sets out to examine this persistence and to explore what happened to both euro 
and non-euro countries’ yield spreads on government bonds after the introduction 
of the euro.  
  2Therefore, we extend the analysis presented in Gómez-Puig (2004) and Gómez-
Puig (2005) to the European Union countries that did not participate in the EMU- 
Denmark Sweden, and the United Kingdom - in order to compare the results with 
those we obtained for the participant countries. We will see that, interestingly, the 
differences in yield spreads behaviour between periods are much more 
accentuated for non-participating countries. Since Currency Union, outside the 
increased substitutability and competition between euro-area markets, non-euro 
countries seem to have benefited from both a lower assessment of their risk 
premium by market participants and a higher assessment of their particular 
“idiosyncrasies” (compared to euro-area countries). This has attracted to their 
markets investors who wished to reduce their portfolio risk through the 
diversification of their investments. As a result, these countries present lower than 
expected borrowing costs. 
In our earlier papers, a first point that was assessed was whether EMU had 
increased credit risk by denying governments the emergency exit of money 
creation and by forbidding both the ECB and the EU to bail out troubled 
governments; or whether, conversely, the maximum threshold that countries had 
for both their budget deficit and their level of public indebtedness (resulting in 
broad improvements in budgetary balances) and the possibility that markets do 
not regard the “no-bail-out” clause as credible, especially in the case of large 
  3markets (i.e. that the theory “too big to fail” holds), had actually resulted in a 
decrease in perceived credit risk.  Secondly, the introduction of the euro reduced 
segmentation between euro-area government bond markets. The removal of the 
exchange rate risk brought down an important barrier that fostered captive 
domestic markets and had gone some way to explaining the home bias that 
existed in cross-border investments in the European Union. Adjaouté et al. (2000) 
traced the extent of the home bias, in both the bond and equities markets, for the 
major European countries – the UK, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, 
and Italy – during the period 1980-1999
1. The increased substitutability of 
sovereign securities after EMU intensified the rivalry between sovereign issuers 
to attract investors, since they were competing directly for the same pool of 
funding. In this new scenario, market liquidity differences may have become a 
more significant component of yield spreads. This was the second point that we 
assessed in our earlier studies. Nevertheless, as the literature on this topic is 
limited, our analysis also built on findings in the empirical literature regarding 
sovereign bond yield spreads on emerging markets, which suggested that spreads 
                                                 
1 They report that the United Kingdom held the highest share of foreign assets as a function of total financial wealth 
(24%); Spain had the smallest (5%), and the Netherlands, Germany and Italy had shares around 17%. Moreover, 
as expected, for bills and bonds, the level of diversification was substantial only for banks in the UK, France and 
the Netherlands, i.e. the countries where intermediaries played an important role as market-makers in the 
eurobond markets. These results are consistent with Tesar and Werner (1995), who present evidence on long-
term international investment patterns in Canada, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US during the 1970-1990 
period. At the beginning of the 1990s, the UK led this sample in international portfolio diversification, with 
foreign security holdings of 32% (compared with 10% in Germany).  
 
  4were also sensitive to international risk factors, mainly US risk factors and interest 
rates (see Codogno, Favero and Missale, 2003). 
Therefore, the analysis in this paper will also be threefold: first, we break down 
non-euro yield spreads into their two main domestic components (market liquidity 
and credit risk differences) not related to exchange risk (we need to make this 
adjustment in order to have homogeneous series for non-euro and euro 
participating countries in which exchange risk was removed in 1999). Second, we 
examine whether there was a change in the price assigned to them by markets 
after the introduction of the euro which might explain the observed yield spread 
behaviour. Third, we will examine the effects of international risk factors on yield 
differentials. The main goal of the analysis will be to identify the possible factors 
behind the average decrease of 14.20 basis points (compared to the average 
increase of 11.98 basis points observed in EMU-countries) in yield spreads during 
the first three years of Monetary Union, once they are corrected from the 
exchange rate factor (following Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa (1997) we will 
correct pre-EMU spreads by estimating the foreign exchange factor as the 
differential between the 10 year swap rate in the currency of denomination of the 
bond and the 10 year swap rate in Deutsche marks) 
The sample is composed of daily data from January 1996 to December 2001 
(therefore, the same time interval - three years - will be considered for both pre-
  5EMU and EMU periods) and includes the three EU-15 countries that preferred to 
stay out of the European Monetary Union: Denmark, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.  
We will present the results of two different specifications which are the ones that 
presented the highest explanatory power in our previous studies, as one important 
goal of this paper is to compare the results of the analysis with those obtained for 
euro-countries (Gómez-Puig, 2004 and 2005). Therefore we will first implement 
(I) a static panel regression
2, and (II) a static regression for each individual 
country  with the same explanatory variables as in the panel estimation. The 
relative debt-to-GDP ratio will be used to identify differences in default risk, 
while two different variables will be used to capture market liquidity: the bid/ask 
spread (a proxy of market tightness) and on-the-run/off-the-run differentials (a 
complementary measure of market liquidity).  Finally, the spread between 10-year 
fixed interest rates on US swaps and the yield on 10-year Moody’s Seasoned 
AAA US corporate bonds is introduced in the model as a proxy of international 
risk factors. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical analysis to date has used a 
daily dataset for two of the most important measures of liquidity, the bid/ask 
                                                 
2 In our earlier papers, we estimated a dynamic model but the introduction of a lag of the dependent variable did not 
improve the results. 
 
  6spreads and the on-the run/off-the run yield differentials, corresponding to the 
trading activity in the whole of the EU-15 securities market.   
The empirical evidence shows that the relevance of international risk factors in 
explaining the observed change in adjusted spreads is larger in non-euro 
participating countries than in euro-area countries. The fact that these countries 
kept their Monetary Autonomy might explain this greater vulnerability to external 
risk factors. However, the results of all the specifications are highly consistent, 
providing evidence that in all European markets (both euro and non-euro 
participants) market size scale economies increased with Currency Union and that 
the rise was higher in smaller debt markets. Hence, they suggest that the removal 
of the exchange rate barrier might have penalised EMU small markets twice. 
First, within the euro-area, the German market could have concentrated the 
majority of the trading activity, and in the current context of increased 
competition between these markets, their relative success might be dependent on 
their size. And, second, outside the euro-area, the Currency Union has enhanced 
the “singularity” of the debt markets because their securities are still denominated 
in their own currency. In particular, the British market, which before EMU not 
only was one of the most important European debt markets, but also was the 
European market that held the highest share of foreign assets as a function of total 
financial wealth (See Adjaouté et al. 2001 or Tesar and Werner 2005), is surely 
  7the one that has capitalised most on this new advantage and has attracted a 
significant volume of funds. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 explains the foreign 
exchange correction applied in the pre-EMU period. Section 3 outlines evidence 
concerning Monetary Integration in Europe and the evolution of the relative cost 
of borrowing in EU-15 countries. Section 4 focuses on the various domestic and 
international factors to which adjusted spreads might be sensitive, and describes 
the data. Section 5 explains the models and estimation methodology. Section 6 
reports the results. Lastly, section 7 draws conclusions. 
2. Foreign exchange risk correction in the pre-EMU period. 
As discussed by Favero et al. (1997) a direct measure of the component of yield 
differentials not related to exchange rate factors can be obtained by comparing the 
yields of assets issued by two different states in two different currencies (say, one 
in Spanish pesetas, the other in D-marks) and the yield spreads in the same 
currencies and with the same life to maturity issued by the same (non-
government) subject, or by two otherwise comparable issuers (in the second case, 
apart from the exchange rate risk, other factors influencing yield spreads can then 
be ignored when differences are taken). Candidates for this measure are: (1) long-
term bonds issued by the same supra-national organisation (such as the World 
  8Bank or the European Investment Bank), (2) long-term bonds issued by the 
private sector, and (3) the fixed interest rates on swap contracts. 
However, on balance, the drawbacks of the interest differential on supranational 
issues or corporate issues seem to be greater. So though not a perfect measure, the 
spread on fixed interest rate swap contracts can be used as an indicator of the 
exchange rate determinant of the yield spread on government bonds, as it seems to 
be the best indicator of this yield spread component.  
Since the early 1980s, interest rate swaps have become a popular vehicle used by 
many companies and financial institutions to hedge against interest rate risk. An 
interest rate swap is an agreement between two parties to exchange a series of 
interest payments without exchanging the underlying debt (which is denominated 
in the same currency), meaning that the default risk of the underlying asset is not 
translated into the level of the fixed interest rate on the swap contract. In a typical 
fixed/floating interest rate swap, the first party promises to pay the second at 
designated intervals a stipulated amount of interest calculated at a fixed rate on 
“the notional principal”. The second party promises to pay the first at the same 
intervals a floating amount of interest on the notional principal calculated 
according to a floating-rate index
3. IRS are liquidated by differences, “cash-flow 
                                                 
3 In this paper, the 6-month money Libor rate (in the respective currency) in non-euro participating countries, and 
Libor rate before the EMU and the Euribor after its implementation in euro-participating countries. 
 
  9netting”. Essentially, then, an interest rate swap is a series of forward contracts on 
some reference interest rate, such as the Libor (see Bicksler and Chen, 1986).  
The fixed rate is the one that is used to price the interest rate swaps
4. IRS usually 
present a spread over the on-the-run government bond yield at the same maturity, 
and their price basically accounts for the counterparty credit risk, the liquidity, the 
market risk of the swap contract, and the exchange-rate risk of the currency of 
denomination of the swap. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that the first three 
components cancel out when the differential between the 10-year swap rate of one 
European country i over, for example, Germany, is taken
5. Hence, the swap rate 
differential is an appropriate measure for capturing the exchange-rate change 
component of yield spreads. 
 
                                                 
4 I.e. if a 10-year Spanish Peseta IRS is 11.50-11.60, this means that one should pay a fixed interest rate of 11.60% 
in exchange for the six-month Spanish Peseta Libor in the euro-market, or the six-month Libor in order to receive 
a fixed rate of 11.50%. 
5 With regard to the counterparty credit risk, not only are most of the participants present in the different currency 
segments of the underlying swap market (the euro-deposit market) the same, but also the counterparty credit risk 
associated with swap rates is currently very low given the set of collateralisation and documentation standards 
recently developed by dealers and customers (see Liu, Longstaff and Mandell (2002), Duffie and Singleton (1997) 
and He (2000)). Secondly, market risk derives from the uncertainty associated with the floating leg of the swap 
contract (the six-month Libor rate). However, because market risk is usually highly correlated within euro-currency 
IRS contracts, it can also be ignored when differentials are taken. Finally, with respect to the liquidity of swaps 
contracts, it is reasonable to assume that, although they are currently very liquid (see BIS statistics), their liquidity 
will be highly correlated with that of the underlying government bonds. Therefore, it may vary within currencies. In 
this case, the estimated foreign exchange component (the swap rate differential) of total yield differentials would be 
biased upward and, consequently, the credit and liquidity component of government bonds would be biased 
downward. However, the data (see table 1) show an increase in the yield spread in the EMU period for some euro-
countries in which the swap differential was not significant in the pre-EMU period. This is the case of Austria, 
Belgium, France and the Netherlands. This finding indicates that the aforementioned biases do not fully explain the 
rise in the price of liquidity and credit risk, when yield spreads are corrected for the foreign exchange factor and 
support the use of the swap rate differential as an appropriate measure for capturing the exchange-rate change 
component of yield spreads.  
 
  10So we denominate: 
Ii,10       =  10-year  Yield on sovereign bonds of country i 
IRSi,10= 10-year Interest Rate Swap rate of currency i  
Where, considering that differences in tax-regimes have been reduced to 
insignificant levels during the course of the 1990s: 
Ii,10=f(DRi,10 ,Li,10 ,ERi.,10)             (1)                            
DRi,10 = Default risk of country i 10-year sovereign bonds.  
Li,10    = Liquidity of country i 10-year sovereign bonds. 
ERi., 10  = Exchange rate risk of currency i over a 10-year horizon. 
Therefore the 10-year yield differential of country i over Germany will be: 
YIELD SPREADit  = [Ii,10 - IGE,10]t =f([DR i,10 - DRGE,10]t , [Li,10 - LGE,10]t , [ERi,10 - 
ERGE,10]t)                                             (2) 
Then, approximating:  
[IRSi,10 - IRSGE,10]t=[ERi,10 - ERGE,10] t   (3)                            
and building up the variable “ADJUSTED SPREADit”, as the difference between 
the total yield differential and the swap rate differential, 
ADJUSTED SPREADit     = ASPREADit  =  
                                       = [Ii,10 - IGE,10]t  – [IRSi,10 - IRSGE,10]t = 
 = f( [DRi,10 - DRGE,10]t , [Li,10 - LGE,10]t , [ERi,10 - ERGE,10]t) - [ERi,10 - ERGE,10]t   (4)                      
  11it can be inferred that the variable ASPREADit, which will be used as the 
dependent variable, will mainly account for credit risk and market liquidity 
differences
6of country i‘s sovereign securities over Germany. So, this variable 
could be considered an appropriate indicator of yield differential components not 
related to exchange rate factors. 
3. Monetary integration and the relative cost of borrowing in EU-15: Some 
evidence. 
The aforementioned elimination of two of the main components of yield 
differentials prompted a substantial convergence in total yield differentials over 
10-year German bond yields during the period January 1999-December 2001 in 
EMU-participating countries. This is shown in table 1: the average spread over 
German yields decreased from 58.22 to 25.24 basis points. Nevertheless, 
convergence only implied a sizeable reduction in the relative borrowing costs for 
the countries that presented wider spreads, lower rating and higher foreign 
exchange risk: that is, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and to a lesser extent Finland and 
Ireland. Conversely, the countries that took less advantage of the elimination of 
the exchange rate risk, Austria, Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, 
experienced an increase in their relative borrowing costs (15.34, 13.24, 11.08 and 
                                                 
6 We are not considering the effect of international risk factors in this breakdown 
 
  1216.92 basis points, on average, respectively, see table 2). To sum up, while 
average gross yield spreads (relative to Germany) declined after EMU, they rose 
in 4 of the 9 countries
7. Moreover, what is really puzzling is that once adjusted for 
the swap differential, spreads rose for all 9 countries with Currency Union. The 
average value is 25.21 basis points in the EMU period compared with 13.23 basis 
points before EMU (see tables 1 and 2).  
However, if we analyse the spread behaviour of non-EMU participating countries 
in the first three years since the introduction of the euro we observe huge 
differences. Figure 1 shows that, for non-euro participating countries as well, total 
yield differentials have converged since Monetary Union. Therefore, on average, 
non-euro countries have experienced a decrease in their borrowing costs since the 
euro. However, the spread reduction is more than twice that registered by euro-
countries (32.99 basis points on average). In particular, the average spread over 
German yields decreased by 73.06 basis points, from 100.81 in the pre-EMU 
period to 27.75 in the EMU period (see table 1) in the three non-euro countries as 
a whole. On the other hand, the swap differential behaviour clearly differs. The 
different pattern that it already showed before the euro (see figure 2) has been 
accentuated after Currency Union and the close convergence to zero of swap 
differentials among euro-countries. Hence, the temporal evolution of the adjusted 
                                                 
7 The previous analysis for EMU-participating countries did not include Greece and Luxembourg 
  13spread presents a completely different picture for non-euro countries after January 
1999 (see figure 3) and its average value has also decreased: 14.20 basis points on 
average between the two periods. Actually, it decreases in Sweden (12.20 basis 
points) and the United Kingdom (30.70) while it experiences a slight increase in 
Denmark (0.31 basis points), the non-euro country with the smallest debt-market 
(see table 3).  
Therefore, in a context of higher integration between European markets, the 
countries that did not join Monetary Union, and thus did not experience an 
increase in their degree of substitutability and competition with the German 
securities, seem to have benefited from that fact in terms of an important decrease 
in their risk premium over Germany (not related to exchange rate factors), which
 has resulted in lower borrowing costs. The main goal of this paper will be to find 
an explanation for these decreasing yield spreads.   
One possible explanation, which is supported by the beliefs of both market 
participants and member state debt managers, could be that in the current context 
of increased competition between euro-area government securities markets their 
success might be limited by the extent of their liquidity and market size. 
Specifically, on the one hand, as the German sovereign debt market is the second 
largest in the euro-area (only surpassed by the Italian), a concentration of trading 
activity in the German market might have occurred and, consequently, wider 
  14liquidity differences vis-à-vis German bonds might have been translated into 
higher adjusted spreads in EMU-participating countries
8. Nevertheless, on the 
other hand, the British sovereign debt market not only is the fourth largest in the 
European Union-15 area (see table 3) but, since Monetary Integration, has also 
benefited from a new advantage over euro-area debt markets because its debt is 
still denominated in a different currency which allows portfolio diversification 
and risk reduction. Therefore, since EMU the British market might have 
capitalised on its role as the main competitor to the German market, and might 
have attracted funds from those investors who wished to reduce their risk by 
investing in a market that still permits portfolio diversification. Consequently, 
with the euro the small-size euro-area debt markets might have been twice 
penalised. First, within the euro-area, the German market could have concentrated 
the majority of the trading activity. And, second, outside the euro-area, the 
enhanced British market might have attracted a significant volume of funds due to 
its “renewed” singularity.  
Some literature supports the importance of market size in the success of a debt 
market. Martin and Rey (2004) show that in general size matters for asset trade, 
meaning that a larger country will benefit from higher asset prices than a smaller 
one, and point out that these market size effects are reminiscent of the home 
                                                 
8 The existence of a very liquid futures bond market in Germany also represents an additional advantage of holding 
German bonds. 
  15market effect in the new trade and geography literatures (Helpman and Krugman, 
1985). As in the trade literature, these effects come from the combination of 
imperfect substitution and transaction costs. McCauley and Remolona (2000) note 
that if substantial fixed costs are involved in the production of information about 
the future path of interest rates, the size of the whole debt market matters. They 
calculate that there may be a size threshold around $100-200 billions; below this 
level, they state that sustaining a liquid government market may not be easy. 
Table 3 shows that while in the euro-area only five countries (Italy, Germany, 
France, Spain and Belgium) surpassed that threshold, in the non-euro-area two 
countries did (Sweden and the United Kingdom) and the third (Denmark) came 
close
9. Economides and Siow (1988) point out that there may be a trade-off 
between liquidity and market size: the smaller the market, the lower the 
outstanding volume traded in it. Therefore, the more difficult it will be for 
investors to process and evaluate information about securities traded in that 
market, and the higher the transaction costs and the liquidity premium. Moreover, 
if size matters for liquidity, “ex-ante” traders would prefer bigger and liquid 
markets (which will present lower price volatility, bigger scale economies and 
higher probability of a favourable match) to small and illiquid markets. 
                                                 
9 Within the euro-area: Austria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal present an overall amount of public sector 
outstanding debt below the $100 billion level, while The Netherlands entire amount of outstanding public debt is 
between $100 and $200 billions. Outside the euro-area: only Denmark presents an amount  slightly below the 
$100 billion level. 
 
  16Consequently, liquidity will be “self-reinforcing”: since traders prefer to 
participate in liquid markets, more traders will participate in them, and more 
liquid they will be. This self-fulfilling nature of liquidity is also outlined by 
Plantin (2003)
    
On the other hand, in a scenario in which EMU denies governments the 
emergency exit of money creation and forbids both the ECB and the EU to bail 
out troubled governments, another possible explanation for the observed rise in 
adjusted spreads in euro-area countries could be a high degree of credibility for 
the “no-bail-out” clause. Consequently, it is vital to assess whether the too big to 
fail theory (TBTF), taken from the banking system
10, might also hold in sovereign 
debt markets; if it does apply, the removal of the exchange rate barrier would have 
punished smaller countries  by making them pay both a higher liquidity and 
higher default risk premium than large ones. In this regard, in the banking system, 
as Kaufman (2002) and Goodhart and Huang (2005) point out, the TBTF theory 
                                                 
10 Too big to fail (TBTF) is a term frequently used in banking to describe how bank regulators may deal with 
severely financially troubled banks. The term came into common usage in 1984, when the regulators were faced 
with the economically insolvent Continental Illinois National in Chicago, which was both the seventh largest 
bank in the country at the time and the largest correspondent bank having interbank deposit and Fed funds 
relationships with more than 2,200 other banks. The federal regulators did not legally close the bank and 
protected all uninsured depositors and creditors against loss. In addition, at least initially, the old shareholders 
were not ousted. The Continental case was resolved in this way, in part, because the regulators believed that, 
particularly because of its large size and broad interconnections with other banks, allowing the bank and/or its 
parent bank holding company to fail and imposing losses on its uninsured depositors and creditors would have 
serious, adverse effects on other banks, financial markets, and the macroeconomy (see Kaufman, 2002).  
 
  17states that adverse shocks from bank failures are perceived to be more strongly 
and widely felt (the existence of serious contagion and systemic risk makes 
regulators perceive that widespread devastation could result from a large bank 
failing) than similar shocks from the failure of non-bank firms of equal size;  the 
larger the bank, the more serious and widespread the damage. Analogously, 
because adverse macroeconomic shocks and contagion consequences to 
neighbouring countries are much greater the larger the country’s debt market, 
agents might expect that, beyond a certain threshold size, governments will 
receive financial support in case of fiscal distress in the form of a bail-out. 
Consequently, while big countries (both euro and non-euro participating) default 
risk premium should not change (or may even decrease) with EMU, for small 
countries (whose public debt market does not reach the threshold size), agents 
might expect the “no-bail-out” rule to hold. So, their default risk should increase 
with their membership of Monetary Union, since they lose monetary authority.  
4. Domestic and international risk factors explaining adjusted yield spreads.  
Now that we have defined the dependent variable (ASPREADit) which allows 
separation of the liquidity and credit risk components from expected exchange-
rate depreciation, a decomposition between the liquidity premium and the credit-
risk component is attempted by modelling their behaviour to a number of factors 
that potentially affect only one of them.  
  18With regard to domestic risk factors, a crucial issue in this paper (and one that is 
vital for policymaking) is the identification of the two main domestic sources of 
risk that have made up yield spreads in euro-participating countries since the start 
of Monetary Integration: (1) differences in credit risk and (2) differences in 
market liquidity, in order to assess whether their impact over yield spreads has 
changed with the common currency in the whole European Union-15 countries. 
With this goal in mind, the relative debt-to-GDP ratio will be used as a proxy to 
measure differences in credit risk. This variable has been widely used in the 
literature by other authors (Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom (1995) among 
them)
11 and presents the advantage over other measures such as the rating 
differential that it cannot be considered an ex-post measure of fiscal sustainability. 
Because market liquidity is an elusive concept, we use the definition provided by 
the Bank for International Settlements (1999): “a liquid market as a market where 
participants can rapidly execute a large volume of transactions with a small 
impact on prices
12”.
 In this paper, two different proxy variables will be used to 
                                                 
11 In particular, these authors find support for the market discipline hypothesis in the U.S. bond markets. This 
hypothesis assumes that yields rise smoothly at an increasing rate with the level of borrowing. However, if these 
incentives prove ineffective, credit markets will eventually respond by denying irresponsible borrowers further 
access to credit. Nevertheless, the model presented in this paper and Bayoumi et al. model do not control for the 
same variables and cannot be compared. 
 
12 Likewise, they point out that the usual approach is to consider market liquidity according to at least one of three 
possible dimensions: tightness, depth and resiliency. Tightness is how far transaction prices diverge from mid-
market prices, and can generally be measured by the bid/ask spread. Depth denotes either the volume of trades 
possible without affecting prevailing market prices, or the amount of orders on the order books of market makers 
  19measure this effect: (i) the bid/ask spread and (ii) the on-the run/off-the run 
spread. 
(i) The bid/ask spread.  
This variable is often used as a measure of liquidity because it reflects the cost 
incurred by a typical investor in unwinding an asset position and measures one of 
the most important dimensions of liquidity: tightness, i.e. how far transaction 
prices differ from mid-market prices. Additionally, the liquidity of an asset is 
generally understood as the ease of its conversion into money. Therefore,  because 
the conversion of an asset into money involves certain costs (searching costs, 
delays, broker’s commissions, etc…), the higher these costs, the lower the degree 
of liquidity. Note that as market dealers reduce their liquidity risk, the bid/ask 
spread should narrow with trading activity.  
ii) The on-the run/off-the run spread.  
The yield spread between more and less liquid securities is also a liquidity 
measure used in the Treasury market (see Fleming, 2003). Since liquidity has 
                                                                                                                                                         
at a given time. Resiliency refers to the speed with which price fluctuations resulting from trades are dissipated, or 
the speed with which imbalances in order flows are adjusted. However, other measures, though they do not 
directly coincide with these three dimensions, are often regarded as readily observable proxies of market 
liquidity: the number and volume of trades, trade frequency, turnover ratio, price volatility, the number of market 
participants, the yield spread between the “on the run” and the “off the run” issues, the outstanding volume of a 
specific security, or the overall outstanding volume of securities traded in one market, among others. 
 
  20value, more liquid securities tend to have higher prices (lower yields) than less 
liquid securities. The yield spread is often calculated as the difference between the 
yield of an off-the-run (older securities of a given maturity) and that of an on-the-
run (benchmark) security with similar cash-flow characteristics. Positive spreads 
indicate that on-the-run securities are trading at a yield discount (or price 
premium) to off-the-run securities. This spread provides an insight into the value 
of liquidity that other measures do not offer.  
To sum up, the two variables described will be used in our models to control for 
market liquidity. However, for the sake of fairness, it has to be noted that 
measuring the liquidity premium remains a difficult issue because market 
liquidity and credit risk interact with each other. The lack of liquidity increases 
the effect of risk. This is because liquidity variables, such as the bid-ask spread, 
reflect the risk borne by market makers in managing unbalanced positions. As 
credit risk increases, so does the risk they face. A (credit-related) flight-to-quality 
argument might also be used to interpret the significance of the on-the-run/off-
the-run differentials
13. 
Lastly, a third point that will be assessed in this paper is the influence of 
international risk factors on yield spreads. Hence, the analysis will also build on 
                                                 
13 See Vayanos (2004) among others. 
 
  21the findings of recent work that suggest that yields spreads on government 
securities are sensitive to international risk factors.  
As defined in section 2, the dependent variable is ASPREADit , i.e. the difference 
between the total yield differential of 10-year government bonds and the 10-year 
interest rate swap differential.  The sample comprises daily data spanning the 
period January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2001. Yields and swap rates are obtained 
from Datastream and correspond to the “on the run” (benchmark) 10-year issue 
for each market at every moment of time. They are quoted rates at market close. 
Datastream creates continuous yield series by taking the yield from the current 
benchmark in each market and using it to update a separate time series. As a 
benchmark changes, data are taken from a new stock on the first day of the 
month. Table 5 presents the starting benchmark dates used by Datastream as well 
as the characteristics of the different benchmarks that compose the yield and swap 
series for non-EMU participating countries.  
With regard to the bid/ask spreads series, daily time-series have been created by 
calculating the spread between the bid and ask quotations provided by Bloomberg 
for the “on the run” (benchmark) 10-year issue for each market at every moment 
in time, using the same benchmarks and starting dates that Datastream uses to 
create the 10-year yields and swap rates series (see table 5). For all the different 
  22issues Bloomberg provides daily quoted prices calculated as the average bid and 
ask quotations at the close. 
A similar methodology is used to build the on-the-run/off-the-run spread daily 
time-series. These series were created by calculating the differences between the 
“on the run” (benchmark) 10-year issue and the “off the run” (immediately older 
security) 10-year issue yields provided by Bloomberg for each market at every 
moment of time, also using the same benchmarks and starting dates that 
Datastream uses to create the 10-year yields and swap rates series (see table 5).  
The overall outstanding amounts of public debt data have been drawn from the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS; see table 3) and the GDP from Eurostat. 
However, as these series are only provided with quarterly frequency, for the 
construction of the relative level of indebtedness and the relative debt-to-GDP 
ratio daily time-series (see table 4), the rest of the data have been extrapolated 
assuming a daily constant rate of increase of those volumes, which in fact present 
very slight differences within countries over the period studied. For this reason, it 
can be assumed that the extrapolation will not produce important biases in the 
data and can be applied in this case. 
  23And finally, the spread between 10-year fixed interest rates on US swaps and the 
yield on 10-year Moody’s Seasoned AAA US corporate bonds (USSPREADit), 
has been calculated from daily data obtained from Datastream.   
All the variables included in the estimation that capture domestic risk factors are 
in relative terms to the German ones, as our dependent variable (ASPREADit) is 
the difference between the total yield differential and the swap differential of 
country i over Germany. Thus, BIDASKDIFit is the difference between the bid/ask 
spread in country i and the bid/ask spread in Germany, ONOFFDIFit    is the 
difference between the on the run /off the run spread in country i and that in 
Germany and LNDEBTGDPit is the (log) deviation of country i debt-to-GDP ratio 
from Germany’s debt-to-GDP ratio. 
5. Modelling adjusted yield spread behaviour. 
 
5.1. Static Panel models with both domestic and international factors.  
 
The first specification is a panel regression that includes three groups or countries. 
In this specification, in addition to the variables already mentioned 
(LNDEBTGDPit, BIDASKDIFit,, ONOFFDIFit,, and USSPREADit), country and 
monthly dummy variables will be introduced, as well as a dummy (DPRE) that 
takes the value 1 in the pre-EMU period (and 0, otherwise). The coefficients of 
the interactions between this dummy and the rest of variables will be calculated. 
  24Finally, in order to assess if there exists a varying relationship between liquidity 
variables and the yield ASPREADSit (if liquidity is self-fulfilling, the proxies of 
market liquidity might present a non-linear relationship, i.e. a liquid/illiquid 
market might lead to an increasingly lower/higher liquidity premium) a quadratic 
specification  for the variables BIDASKDIFit,  and  ONOFFDIFit    will be 
formulated. So, with the following defined previously: 
BIDASKDIF2it =  (BIDASKDIF)
2
it 
ONOFFDIF2it =   (ONOFFDIF)
2
it
the domestic risk variables (DRVit) will be: 
DRVit=(LNDEBTGDPit,BIDASKDIFit,BIDASKDIF2it, 
ONOFFDIFit,ONOFFDIF2it)                                                                      (5) 
While the international risk variables (IRVit)  will be: 
IRVit = USSPREADit     (6)                            
The international risk variable that allows adjusted spreads to be explained in 
terms of exogenous risk premiums (specifically, banking risk premiums in the 
United States) will appear in the regression both linearly and interacting with the 
domestic risk variables. This captures the idea that international risk affects 
adjusted yield differentials because European government bonds are imperfect 
substitutes due to differences in either market liquidity or default risk. Therefore, 
  25the interaction term identifies changes in adjusted spreads that can be entirely 
attributed to domestic risk differentials. However, the linear term is also 
necessary, as international factors might affect the adjusted yield spread either 
because of “structural” differences in market liquidity or differences in non-
varying unobservable fundamentals, such as the reputation of the issuing 
governments. Hence, the independent effect of domestic risk variables on adjusted 
spreads is also controlled by entering these variables linearly in the regressions.   
Therefore, the first specification will be a panel model with both domestic and 
international risk variables: 
yit = αi + βXit +γDPREit +δMONTHLYDUMMIESt  + λCOUNTRYDUMMIESi + εit                      
where, with the international (IRVit) and domestic risk variables (DRVit,) 
previously defined. 
The vector of independent variables will be: 
 Xit= (IRVit, DRVit, DRVit*IRVit )   (7)                            
In addition  




  265.2.. Regressions for each individual country. 
 
In the panel regression above, all country dummies turn out to be significant at the 
5 percent confidence level, meaning that specific factors in each different country 
are relevant and suggesting that a separate estimation for each of them will 
provide wider information. We will do this in the second set of regressions where, 
using the same independent variables as in the panel regression, a static estimation 
will be implemented separately for each of the three non-euro countries in the 
sample. Therefore, the following empirical model on daily data will be 
implemented separately for each individual country:  
yit = αi + βXit +γDPREit+ εit   (8)                            
Hence, three regressions will be calculated, where the vector of independent 
variables will be: 
 Xit= (IRVit, DRVit, DRVit*IRVit )                                                                                                       
Obviously, as in the panel regressions, in model II: 
β = β1 + β2DPREit                  
6. Results. 
The estimation methods used in all specifications, Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) in the panel estimation and a regression with Newey-West 
  27standard errors in the estimations for each non-euro-country, are robust to the 
possible existence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the error terms.  
Tables 6 and 7 present respectively the values and standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients corresponding to the first and second specifications, while table 8 
presents the results obtained from the second specification when it was estimated 
for the euro-area countries. For each exogenous variable, these tables allow 
calculation of the corresponding marginal effects for the EMU period (β1) and the 
pre-EMU (β1+ β2), from the estimated coefficient values. 
In particular, table 6 presents the results for the static panel regression which 
includes both domestic and international risk factors and, in order to compare the 
results, also introduces the results obtained from the same panel regression when 
it was applied to the euro-participating countries. Because of their length, the 
coefficients of the monthly and the country dummy variables are not presented, 
although monthly dummies are significant in the majority of the periods. As for 
the country dummies, all of them are significant. Therefore, specific factors in 
each different country are relevant, which means that a separate estimation for 
each of them (as in the second specification) might provide wider information. 
Specifically, the panel regression for non-euro countries shows that not only does 
the default risk premium not increase with Currency Union but its marginal 
impact becomes negative with the euro. Even so, the increase in the EMU period 
  28of the marginal impact of the interaction of the default risk proxy with the 
international risk factor qualifies to some extent the previous results. Actually, 
what seems to be relevant is the increase in the marginal effect of the international 
factor which, in addition, is higher than the one we obtained for euro-countries. 
Finally, with regard to the variables that capture liquidity risk, we should note that 
the on-the-run/ off-the-run differential not only increases its marginal impact with 
the euro, but also shows a non-linear behaviour that supports the self-fulfilling 
behaviour of liquidity.      
Conversely, the panel estimation for EMU-countries not only showed that 
government securities adjusted yield differentials carried a credit risk premium to 
compensate investors for bearing default risk, but it also registered an increase 
with Monetary Integration. So, at least for all EMU countries as a whole, the 
results suggested that the “no-bail-out” was credible: that is, markets expected the 
EU Commission or the ECB to support financially distressed countries (table 8 
will show that this results, however, were less conclusive in the country-specific 
regressions, where the marginal impact of the default risk variable in the EMU 
period differed within countries according to the size of their  markets) On the 
other hand, with respect to the variables that were used as proxies of market 
liquidity, both the bid/ ask spread and the on-the-run/ off-the run marginal impact 
rose in the EMU period. As mentioned, the international risk factor marginal 
  29effect registered a slight increase with the euro, but lower than the one 
experienced by non-euro participating countries.  
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the country-specific estimations for the non-
euro and euro-participating countries respectively, using the same dependent 
variables as those used in the panel regressions. Consequently, they give more 
precise information for each specific country and, in fact suggest very interesting 
results. Table 7 presents the results for non-euro countries: the United Kingdom, 
Sweden and Denmark. In the case of the British market we should point out that 
all the explanatory variables used in the regression lose their significance in the 
EMU period. Therefore, variables other than those used as proxies of domestic 
risk (default and market liquidity) or international risk must explain the decrease 
of the 10-year adjusted spread over Germany (30.70 basis points on average) in 
the EMU period. In our opinion, one possible explanation could be a flight of 
funds from small euro-area debt markets to the enhanced British debt market 
which not only is big enough to be liquid by itself, but, since the introduction of 
the common currency, presents an additional advantage in terms of allowing 
portfolio diversification, since its securities are not denominated in euros. In the 
Swedish market we should also mention the decrease in the marginal impact of 
the default risk variable in the EMU period, in spite of its very high debt-to-GDP 
ratio (see table 4). Hence, it seems that the default risk might be compensated by 
  30its increased liquidity, both because it has a “relevant” size (which could reduce 
the importance of default risk as long as agents believe that it is “too big to fail”) 
and because its singularity has increased since Monetary Union. The increase in 
the significance of the non-linear term of the bid-ask spread since EMU supports 
the self-fulfilling nature of liquidity (that is, that it increases the more liquid the 
market is) and is in concordance with the rest of the results. Finally, Denmark, the 
only non-euro participating country that, even very slightly, has experienced an 
increase of its adjusted spread over Germany with the euro (0.31 basis points on 
average) is the one with the smallest debt-market. This seems to support the 
theory that big markets are the ones that have experienced the most benefits from 
Monetary Integration. Actually, the marginal impact of the non-linear term of 
both the bid/ask and the on-the-run/ off-the-run spreads registers an increase in 
the EMU period when it is interacted with the international risk proxy. This result 
supports the increasingly nature of illiquidity in the case of a small-debt market 
such as the Danish market. So, as Economides and Siow (1988) point out, since 
traders prefer to participate in liquid markets, their transactions will flee from 
illiquid to more liquid markets, fostering a liquidity trade-off from the small to 
larger debt markets.       
Table 8 presents the results of the same regressions applied to euro-countries. 
There are some notable differences. First, the variation in the marginal impact of 
  31the default risk variable in the EMU period differs, within the euro-area, 
according to the size of the market. Therefore, while in small markets the 
marginal effect increases (as in the Netherlands) or remains positive in spite of 
falling (as in Austria and Finland), in larger and more indebted countries
14 the 
impact either remains negative (as in Belgium) or becomes negative (as in Italy, 
Spain and Portugal). These results clearly suggest that the FBTF theory holds in 
euro-area sovereign debt markets, since they reinforce the relevance of market 
size in the degree of explanatory power of credit risk variables. In addition, the 
majority of the countries that present an increase in the marginal effect of one of 
the market liquidity proxies in the EMU period have either very small or very 
large government debt markets. For instance, with EMU, the non-linear behaviour 
of one of the market liquidity variables included in the model (the on-the-run/off-
the-run spreads) is particularly notable in two of the smallest (Austria and 
Finland) and two of the largest markets (France and Spain). Analogously, for the 
smallest and the biggest debt markets (Ireland and Italy, respectively) the non-
linear term of the bid/ask spread has risen since EMU. This non-linear behaviour 
of market liquidity variables (if they increase/decrease, liquidity premium 
rises/drops at an increasing rate), especially in small and large debt markets, again 
supports the idea that liquidity is self-fulfilling. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
14 During the period 1996-2001 the five EU-15 countries with the larger ratio debt-to-GDP: were Belgium 
(102.28%), Italy (95.07%), Sweden (54.55%, Denmark (52.80%) and Spain (48.81%) (see table 4). 
  32international risk variable marginal impact (unlike in the panel regression) in the 
few cases where it is significant becomes negative with the euro. However, when 
the variable that captures international risk is interacted with the linear term of 
some market liquidity proxies the marginal impact over adjusted spreads registers 
a change in the EMU period for some small markets. 
7. Conclusions 
Non-euro participating countries’ adjusted spreads experienced an average 
decrease of 14.20 basis points with Currency Union. Conversely, euro-area 
countries’ adjusted spreads over 10-year German securities registered an average 
rise of 11.98 basis points in the first three years of EMU,  resulting in a lower than 
expected decrease in the costs of borrowing (which actually increased in the case 
of Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands). Therefore, in a context of 
higher integration between European markets, the countries that did not join 
Monetary Union, and thus did not experience an increase in their degree of 
substitutability and competition with German securities, seem to have benefited 
from that fact, in the shape of an important decrease in their risk premium that has 
resulted in lower borrowing costs. However, while in euro-area markets a change 
in the market assessment of domestic (both liquidity and default risk) rather than 
international factors (which would only play a smaller role) might be behind the 
increase observed in adjusted spreads with Monetary Integration, even though the 
  33effect differs according to the size of the market
15; as mentioned, in non-euro 
participating countries, the importance of international risk factors in explaining 
adjusted spread changes increases. The fact that these countries do not share a 
common Monetary Policy might explain this greater vulnerability to external risk 
factors.  
However the results of all specifications are highly consistent. They provide 
evidence that market size scale economies seem to have increased with Currency 
Union and that the smaller the debt market, the higher the rise. Actually, since 
January 1999 the adjusted spread over 10-year German bonds has increased in all 
euro-area countries and in the smallest non-euro participating country (Denmark, 
which experienced an average rise of 0.31 basis points), and table 3 shows that 
with an average market share of 22.05%, the German market is the second biggest 
in the euro-area, only surpassed by the Italian. Hence, on the one side, an 
improvement of relative German market liquidity might be behind the adjusted 
spread changes. In fact, within the euro-area, the countries with a larger debt 
market relative to Germany (Italy, France and Spain) are the ones that have 
experienced the lowest rise in their adjusted spreads with the introduction of the 
euro (see table 2). Indeed, other authors as Bernoth, von Hagen and Schuknecht 
                                                 
15 These results seem consistent, they point out that, since EMU, market assessment of both liquidity and default 
risk (whose measurement, see section 4, is difficult because the two variables interact with  each other) is closely 
related within countries as it depends on the size of their debt  market. 
  34(2004) also state that since EMU the German government bond yields have still 
been below those of bonds issued by governments with much better debt 
positions. In their view, the fact that German bonds enjoy a yield advantage 
compared to others may be due to the size of the German bond market and the 
fact that German bonds can be traded immediately at lower transaction costs and 
with a smaller risk of price changes due to individual transactions
16, an opinion 
that seems to support our conclusions. On the other hand, outside the euro-area, 
the enhanced British market might also have attracted an significant volume of 
funds due to its “renewed” singularity which still allowed investors to reduce their 
risk investing in a market where debt is denominated in a different currency. 
Hence, the British market might have capitalised on its role as the German 
market’s main competitor.  
Therefore, the removal of the exchange rate barrier seems to have punished euro-
area smaller markets twice (they are forced to compete in terms of liquidity with 
larger countries for the same pool of funding, only being able to offer smaller 
bond issues), by making them pay both higher liquidity and a higher default risk 
premium than larger ones. This empirical evidence is also in concordance with the 
fact that the three countries that account for around 59% of the euro-area 
government securities markets (Italy, France and Spain) are precisely the ones 
                                                 
16 In addition, these authors also conclude that countries whose national debt has a larger share in total EU debt pay 
lower interest rates than EU countries with smaller shares. 
  35with the lowest adjusted spread rise since Monetary Integration (see tables 1 and 
2). Moreover, in the two samples, default risk only seems to be relevant when it is 
accompanied by a small market size. These results then show that the theory “too 
big to fail” holds: it is expected that large countries will be bailed out in case of 
fiscal distress. This explains why the default risk premium has decreased for some 
big countries since EMU. In small countries, on the other hand, markets expect 
that the “no-bail-out” clause will hold, and membership of the monetary union has 
increased the default risk since these countries have lost monetary authority. In 
both Italy and Sweden, for instance, in spite of their very high debt-to-GDP ratio, 
the associated default risk might be compensated by both the increased liquidity 
characteristic of a big market and the lack of credibility of the no-bail-out clause.  
Finally, these results reinforce the self-fulfilling nature of market liquidity. In the 
case of both the smallest and the largest debt markets, illiquidity or liquidity 
presents a non-linear behaviour that supports the idea that traders’ transactions 
flee from illiquid to liquid debt markets. So, the more liquid (illiquid) a market is, 
the more traders want (do not want) to participate in it, resulting in an increase 
(decrease) in the liquidity of the market. In particular, both the German and the 
British market might have benefited from an increase in their trading activity 
which has penalised small European debt markets that registered increases in their 
adjusted spreads.  
  36To conclude, with the introduction of a common currency and in the current 
context of higher competition between euro-area government securities markets, 
the success of these sovereign securities debt markets may be highly dependent on 
their market size, while non-euro participating countries, which did not suffer the 
increase in their degree of substitutability and competition mentioned above, seem 
to have benefited from the fact that market participants consider their risk 
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NOTE:  Yield differential = (Ii – IDM), where Ii is the 10-year yield on country i 
government bonds and IDM is the 10-year yield on Germany government bonds. 
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FIGURE 2   
 






















































































































































































































































































































































































NOTE: Swap differential = (IRSi – IRSDM), where IRSi is the 10-year interest rate 
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NOTE: Adjusted  yield spread = Yield differential – Swap differential = (Ii - IDM) 

















  43TABLE 1      
 
PRE-EMU (1996-1998) EMU (1999-2001)
(Ii-IDM)( I R S i-IRSDM) ASPREADi (Ii-IDM)( I R S i-IRSDM) ASPREADi
(1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4) (5) (6)=(4)-(5)
EURO 
AT 9.07 -0.33 9.40 24.42 -0.01 24.43
BE 33.06 4.29 28.77 46.30 -0.01 46.31
FI 43.56 41.31 2.25 21.95 -0.01 21.96
FR 2.97 -3.10 6.07 14.05 0.00 14.05
IE 50.52 43.84 6.68 14.78 0.00 14.78
IT 157.73 133.04 24.69 32.32 0.05 32.27
NL -2.70 -3.52 0.83 14.22 -0.01 14.23
PT 111.73 91.42 20.31 31.85 0.22 31.63
SP 118.06 97.99 20.07 27.24 0.04 27.20
Average 58.22 44.99 13.23 25.24 0.03 25.21
St.dev. 57.48 51.37 10.33 10.66 0.08 10.64
NON-EURO 
DK 64.01 61.09 2.92 35.83 32.61 3.23
SW 108.48 117.15 -8.67 28.14 49.01 -20.87
UK 129.95 142.05 -12.10 19.27 62.07 -42.80
Average 100.81 106.77 -5.95 27.75 47.90 -20.15
St.dev. 33.63 41.46 7.87 8.29 14.76 23.02
 
 
NOTE: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, FI: Finland, FR: France, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, 
NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SP: Spain, DK: Denmark, SW: Sweden and 
UK: United Kingdom. Source: Datastream.  
(Ii- IDM) = 10-year yield difference over Germany 
(IRSi – IRSDM) = 10-year interest rate swap difference over Germany 
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NOTE: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, FI: Finland, FR: France, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, 
NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SP: Spain, DK: Denmark, SW: Sweden and 
UK: United Kingdom. Source: Datastream.  
(Ii- IDM) = 10-year yield difference over Germany 
(IRSi – IRSDM) = 10-year interest rate swap difference over Germany 














  45TABLE 3 
 
DOMESTIC DEBT SECURITIES 
PUBLIC SECTOR AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING
                                                               (Billions of euros)
  1995-12  1996-12   1997-12  1998-12  1999-12  2000-12 2001-12 average % over EMU % over EU-15
     Ireland  19.93 23.20 23.12 21.93 24.73 24.07 19.95 23.15 0.69 0.59
     Portugal 35.19 36.47 32.84 34.04 37.49 42.35 45.61 37.67 1.13 0.95
     Finland 33.20 38.15 41.56 44.28 45.60 47.70 46.28 43.39 1.30 1.10
     Austria 57.04 58.95 63.87 69.28 86.05 99.74 100.52 76.80 2.30 1.94
     Greece 64.10 79.58 84.47 84.80 88.43 96.73 102.20 87.23 2.62 2.21
     Netherlands 155.64 159.89 159.68 170.12 178.14 180.98 177.50 171.44 5.14 4.34
     Belgium  228.86 230.59 228.41 229.67 231.85 246.18 248.66 236.75 7.10 5.99
     Spain 211.07 241.63 259.63 272.41 287.34 311.04 299.43 269.56 8.09 6.82
     France  497.35 536.05 565.50 623.91 639.85 708.45 709.23 614.79 18.45 15.56
     Germany 676.53 682.74 699.45 738.75 767.35 816.77 790.81 734.97 22.05 18.60
     Italy  896.49 1022.19 1011.08 1037.09 1042.62 1088.36 1056.96 1036.69 31.11 26.23
     EMU 2875.40 3109.45 3169.63 3326.27 3429.43 3662.37 3597.15 3332.43 100.00 84.33
     Denmark 89.78 90.22 87.89 87.70 86.74 86.93 82.03 88.63 - 2.24
     Sweden 111.09 114.30 110.02 111.34 123.04 117.24 91.22 111.83 - 2.83
     U.Kingdom 316.49 373.76 418.68 396.12 456.97 475.31 460.79 418.69 - 10.60
 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 
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Ireland 26.594  
 

























  47TABLE 5 
                             
Starting date as a benchmark Name Coupon Maturity date
DENMARK
Jan-96 DANSKE STAT 1994 8% 15/03/06
Jul-97 DANSKE STAT 1996 7% 15/11/07
Feb-99 DANSKE STAT 1998 6% 15/11/09
Mar-01 DANSKE STAT 2000 6% 15/11/11
SWEDEN
Nov-96 SVENSKA 1996 6.5%
Feb-97 SVENSKA 1996 8% 15/08/07
Feb-98 SVENSKA 1997 6.5% 05/05/08
Jul-98 SVENSKA 1993 9% 20/04/09
Feb-01 SVENSKA 2000 5 1/4% 15/03/11
UNITED KINGDOM
Mar-96 TREASURY 7.50% 07/12/06
May-97 TREASURY 7.25% 07/12/07
Oct-98 TREASURY 9% 13/10/08
Apr-99 TREASURY 5.75% 07/12/09
Apr-01 TREASURY 6.25% 25/11/10

























  48TABLE 6    
Cross-Sectional Time-Serie FGLS Regression.
Sample: Pre-EMU: 1996:01-1998:12
                       EMU: 1999:01-2001:12
dependent variable: ASPREAD SPECIFICATION I (non-euro countries) SPECIFICATION I (euro countries)
(Gómez-Puig, 2005)
X it ß 1 (X it)ß 2 (DPRE it*X it)ß 1 (X it)ß 2 (DPRE it*X it)
LNDEBTGDP it -0.316** 0.563** 0.181** -0.017**
(0.060) (0.080) (0.008) (0.002)
ONOFFDIF it 1.162** -3.193** 1.782** -1.082**
(0.087) (0.202) (0.104) (0.118)
ONOFFDIF2 it 3.968** -2.888** -10.686** 5.133**
(0.516) (0.681) (0.608) (0.616)
BIDASKDIF it - 1.307** 0.557** -0.386**
(0.475) (0.050) (0.075)
BIDASKDIF2 it - - - -2.670**
(0.742)
USSPREAD it 0.109** -0.198** 0.034** -0.018**
(0.021) (0.041) (0.007) (0.009)
LNDEBTGDP*USSPREAD it 0.254** -0.845** 0.050** -0.082**
(0.051) (0.113) (0.003) (0.003)
ONOFFDIF*USSPREAD it -0.802** 4.287** -1.860** 0.899**
(0.109) (0.371) (0.106) (0.145)
ONOFFDIF2*USSPREAD it -5.700** - 15.425** -6.340**
(0.815) (0.720) (0.726)
BIDASKDIF*USSPREAD it -0.822* - -0.401** -
(0.430) (0.059)
BIDASKDIF2*USSPREADit - 16.744** - 4.301**
(8.372) (0.731)
γ     γ    





Number of observations =  3402 12139
Number of groups = 39
Avg obs per group = 1195.5 1406
Log likelihood =  6734.189 23893.12
Wald chi2 = 17824 53337.41
Prob > chi2 = 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.






  49TABLE 7 
SPECIFICATION II (non-euro countries)
Regression with Newey-West Standard Errors
Sample: Pre-EMU: 1996:01-1998:12
                       EMU: 1999:01-2001:12
dependent variable: ASPREAD
                               DENMARK                                 SWEDEN                                 UNITED KINGDOM
X t ß 1 (X t)ß 2 (DPRE*X t)ß 1 (X t)ß 2 (DPRE*X t)ß 1 (X t)ß 2 (DPRE*X t)
LNDEBTGDP t - - -3.331** 3.284**
(0.898) (0.963)
ONOFFDIF t -1.191** - 7.185** -6.143** 1.561**
(0.442) (2.568) (2.644) (0.463)
ONOFFDIF2 t -6.539** 11.493** -129.52** 124.94** 11.679**
(2.856) (3.450) (56.664) (56.651) (1.830)
BIDASKDIF t 2.317** 3.129** -4.665** - -3.492**
(0.981) (1.573) (0.917) (1.071)
BIDASKDIF2 t (-47.777) -41.845* 36.244** - 28.100*
(21.132) (23.430) (13.142) (15.825)
USSPREAD t - - - - 0.124
0.053
LNDEBTGDP*USSPREAD t ----
ONOFFDIF*USSPREAD t - 3.032* -10.986** 9.755**
(1.638) (4.441) (4.590)
ONOFFDIF2*USSPREAD t 10.160** -18.984** 283.37** -279.22** -16.634**
(4.590) (5.842) (94.909) (94.959) (3.344)
BIDASKDIF*USSPREAD t -3.358** - 8.779** - 7.353**
(1.608) (2.086) (1.635)
BIDASKDIF2*USSPREAD t 71.586** 75.251** -85.035** 79.203** -20.543** -51.382**
(36.179) (39.973) (25.838) (33.831) (9.071) (23.851)
γ  γ  γ 
DPRE - - 0.125*
(0.075)
αα α
CONSTANT 0.283** 0.556** -0.286**
(0.063) (0.279) (0.074)
Number of obs 1485 1069 848
F (23, 1461) 98.59 135.93 200.56
Prob > F = 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.







  50TABLE 8 
SPECIFICATION II (euro countries), Gómez-Puig (2005)
Regression with Newey-West Standard Errors
Sample: Pre-EMU: 1996:01-1998:12
                       EMU: 1999:01-2001:12
dependent variable: ASPREAD
                               AUSTRIA                                     BELGIUM                                       FINLAND                                     FRANCE                                 IRELAND                            ITALY                      THE NETHERLANDS                             PORTUGAL                            SPAIN
X t ß 1 (X t)ß 2 (DPRE*X t)ß 1 (X t)ß 2 (DPRE*X t)ß 1 (X t)ß 2  (DPRE*X t)ß 1 (X t)ß 2  (DPRE*X t)ß 1 (X t)ß 2 (DPRE*X t)ß 1 (X t)ß 2 (DPRE*X t)ß 1 (X t)ß 2 (DPRE*X t)ß 1 (X t)ß 2  (DPRE*X t)ß 1 (X t)ß 2 (DPRE*X t)
LNDEBTGDP t 0.916** 1.638** -1.517** - 0.533** 5.500** - - - - -2.373** 5.703** 0.500** -0.298** -1.283** 1.011** -2.071** 5.689**
(0.132) (0.646) (0.324) (0.115) (2.260) (0.165) (0.665) (0.115) (0.117) (0.189) (0.239) (0.251) (0.689)
ONOFFDIF t -2.141** 3.744** -1.365** -2.290** -1.631** 4.524** -1.271** 4.018** - - -1.358** 1.913** - - - 1.594** - -
(0.432) (0.566) (0.577) (0.971) (0.247) (0.924) (0.417) (1.062) (0.390) (0.545) (0.284)
ONOFFDIF2 t 17.615** -15.591* - 18.141** 10.813** -17.480** 23.925** -61.363** 4.766** - - - - - - -7.161** 11.072** -17.219**
(4.855) (8.433) (7.735) (1.750) (2.934) (6.518) (13.129) (2.171) (1.797) (3.385) (5.609)
BIDASKDIF t 0.399** 4.733** -0.320** -3.901** - - -0.578** 4.019** - - - - - -1.344** - -0.348* - 1.236*
(0.186) (1.080) (0.134) (0.914) (0.189) (1.535) (0.239) (0.180) (0.754)
BIDASKDIF2 t -2.041** -93.305** - 84.921** - - - 146.486** 191.559** -281.101** 10.017** -11.053** - 6.816* 6.043** - 17.571** -
(0.948) (30.215) (32.750) (72.806) (95.043) (115.133) (4.474) (4.959) (3.807) (1.015) (2.972)
USSPREAD t - - - - -0.051** 1.262** - 0.629** - -0.450** -1.735** 4.359** -0.659** 0.220** - 0.395** -0.395** 2.494**
(0.018) (0.249) (0.211) (0.227) (0.149) (1.265) (0.162) (0.032) (0.026) (0.056) (0.344)
LNDEBTGDP*USSPREAD t -0.533** -2.561** - - -0.525** -9.975** - - - - 2.079** -4.394** - -0.613** 3.695** -2.920** 2.307** -9.159**
(0.155) (1.222) (0.156) (4.363) (0.170) (1.270) (1.133) (0.277) (0.373) (0.276) (1.154)
ONOFFDIF*USSPREAD t 2.181** -4.813** - 4.377** 1.815** -7.608** - -4.412** 1.413** - 1.773** - - - -2.938** - - 1.561*
(0.648) (0.957) (1.475) (0.312) (1.542) (1.604) (0.619) (0.663) (0.493) (0.863)
ONOFFDIF2*USSPREAD t -22.792** - - -31.968** -12.218** 27.089** -26.901** 95.507** -11.707** - - 24.480* - - - 12.515** -13.033** 21.534**
(7.524) (10.655) (2.041) (4.846) (9.914) (21.334) (3.366) (12.518) (2.087) (5.661) (8.477)
BIDASKDIF*USSPREAD t - -9.074** 0.534** 8.753** - -17.471** - -6.193** 11.310* - - - - 1.291** 1.055** - -0.296* -
(2.057) (0.126) (1.590) (7.304) (2.962) (6.047) (0.321) (0.279) (0.165)
BIDASKDIF2*USSPREAD t - 207.74** - -140.378** - 69.629* -14.353* -256.990* -326.538** 503.828** -17.142** 20.207** - - - -7.152** -26.030** -
(58.660) (60.130) (37.129) (8.074) (144.199) (152.508) (202.411) (4.646) (6.013) (1.548) (5.093)
γ  γ  γ  γ  γ  γ  γ  γ  γ 
DPRE - - -0.619** -0.299 - -5.576** - - -1.590**
(0.136) (0.142) (0.663) (0.201)
αα α α α α α α α
CONSTANT 0.194** 1.782** 0.267** - - 2.361** 0.744** 0.134** 0.655**
(0.022) (0.300) (0.012) (0.146) (0.141) (0.022) (0.054)
Number of obs 1481 1492 310 1478 582 1489 1490 1323 1494
F =    F(23,1457) = 621.77                 F(23,1468) = 429.29            F(23,1286) = 183.71                         F(23,1454) = 107.29                 F(23,558) = 75.52                   F(23,1465) = 308.20                          F(22,1467) = 364.47                    F(13,1308) = 143.58                   F(23,1470) = 148.17
Prob > F = 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses  
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